Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. This has provided for a practical examination of an assortment of auction mechanisms and, amongst these, two simultaneous ascending price auctions have proved to be extremely successful. These are the simultaneous multiround ascending auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA). It has long been known that, for certain classes of valuation functions, the SMRA provides good theoretical guarantees on social welfare. However, no such guarantees were known for the CCA.
Introduction
The question of how best to allocate spectrum dates back over a century. In the academic literature, the case in favor of the sale of bandwidth was first formalized by Coase [14] in 1959. Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. Moreover, for these bandwidth auctions, it has become apparent that "not all markets are alike". Outcomes, in terms of economic efficiency, revenue and the resultant level of competition in the telecommunications industry, are heavily dependent upon the choice of auction mechanism -see [31] , [30] and [16] for detailed discussions.
In practice, two simultaneous ascending price type auctions have proved extremely successful: the simultaneous multiround ascending auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA). The SMRA was designed by Milgrom, Wilson and McAfee for the 1994 FCC spectrum auction; see [34] . Compared with sealed-bid auctions, such as the VCG, ascending auctions are widely believed to be more suitable for this scenario. For example, ascending auctions induce information transfers that allow prices to more accurately reflect valuations. 1 A consequence is more economically efficient allocations and, potentially, higher revenues. The SMRA has been very successful in practice but it also has drawbacks [16] . Amongst them is the exposure problem: a large set may be desired but such a bid may result in being allocated only a smaller undesirable subset. In auctions with complementarities, such as the spectrum auctions, this can become a serious issue. The CCA, due to Porter et al. [36] , was designed to overcome this problem, and its usage has gained substantial momentum recently. Within the last two years, over ten major spectrum auctions have used extensions of the CCA [5, 16, 2] and generated approximately 20 billion dollars in revenue [2] . 2 Whilst, under certain conditions, there are theoretical explanations for the high social welfare (economic efficiency) produced by the SMRA [33, 29, 24, 23] , the performance guarantee of the CCA remains elusive. One possible reason for this lack of success is that, upon first examination, no good welfare guarantees seem achievable for the CCA, even for very simple valuation functions. In Section 6.1, we show that the welfare ratio -the worst case ratio between the social welfare of the optimum allocation and the social welfare of the CCA allocation -can be as high as O( √ n)
even for unit-demand bidders. Here n denotes the total number of bidders (we will denote by m the number of items). Moreover, we also show the welfare ratio can be has high as O(n)-ratio, even when demand bundles have cardinality at most two. However, a better selection of price increments, allows us to obtain polylogarithmic upper bounds on the welfare ratio for the CCA if the bidders demand is small (e.g. she is only interested in bundles of cardinality at most polylogarithmic in the number of items and bidders). In the Porter et al. CCA mechanism, price increments were fixed to be 1 whenever there is excess demand. We obtain our strong welfare guarantees simply by requiring the price increments to be a function of excess demand. Specifically, if there are k bids containing item j then we increase p j by ǫ · k, where ǫ is a small constant chosen by the auctioneer. With this modification, we obtain:
Informal Theorem 1. If all bids have cardinality at most C, then either the revenue of the CCA is at least an Ω( 1 C 2 log n log 2 m )-fraction of the optimal social welfare, or the welfare of the CCA is at least an Ω( 1 log n )-fraction of the optimal welfare. This result has two appealing properties. First, it does not make any assumption on the valuations. Hence, it accommodates complementarities, which are common in combinatorial auctions but are typically hard to deal with. Second, it guarantees that either the revenue of the CCA is high or the welfare is close to the optimal. Since the social welfare is always not smaller than the revenue, our theorem directly implies the following upper bound on the welfare ratio.
Informal Theorem 2. If all bids have cardinality at most C then the welfare ratio for the CCA is at most O(C 2 log n log 2 m).
Therefore when bidders only demand sets of cardinality at most k, where k = O(poly(log n, log m)), the CCA has polylogarithmic welfare ratio.
So the choice of price-increments is fundamental in guaranteeing good performance. Our results show that the choice of stopping rule is also critical. Indeed, they rely upon usage of the original stopping rule of Porter et al. [36] . However, in recent versions of the CCA this stopping rule has been replaced by the simpler stopping rule used by the SMRA -unfortunately, we show in Section 6.2 that the SMRA stopping rule is insufficient to guarantee good welfare. Finally, one might wonder if the dependence on C is necessary. We show in Section 5 that this dependence is unavoidable for general valuations.
Informal Theorem 3. For any integer C, there exist arbitrarily large integers n and m and an auction with n bidders and m items such that each bidder only bid on sets with cardinality at most C where the welfare ratio of the CCA is at least Ω(C · log m log log m ).
We now provide a brief road-map of our paper. In Section 2, we give an overview of the CCA and SMRA auctions and discuss related work. We give a formal description of the CCA in Section 3. In Section 6, we provide examples showing that wrong choices of price increment and stopping condition can be detrimental for the performance of the CCA. In Section 4.1, we introduce some of the key ideas and techniques required in a simple setting. Namely, we use them to prove a polylogarithmic welfare guarantee for the special case of unit-demand bidders. We generalize this approach to obtain our main results in Section 4.2. Finally, we prove a lower bound of welfare approximation for the CCA in Section 5.
An Overview of the SMRA and CCA
Both the SMRA and the CCA are based upon the same underlying ascending price mechanism: at time t, each item j has a price p t j . At these prices, each bidder i selects her preferred set S t i of items. The price of any item that has excess demand then rises in the next time period and the process then is repeated. The first major difference between these auction mechanisms lies in the bidding language. The SMRA uses item bidding. The auctioneer views the selection S t i as a collection of bids, one bid for every subset of S t i . However this leads to the exposure problem. To overcome this problem, the CCA uses package (combinatorial) bidding. A package bid is an all-or-nothing proposition: the selection of S t i is a bid for exactly S t i and nothing else. The original CCA, due to Porter et al. [36] , terminates whenever the last round bids are disjoint and not in conflict with the revenue-optimal allocation; see Section 3 for details. The SMRA (and later versions of the CCA) terminates when there is no excess demand for any item. The auctions differ significantly in how items are allocated. The SMRA utilizes the concept of standing high bid. Any item (with a positive price) has a provisional winner. That bidder will win the item unless a higher bid is received in a later round. If such a bid is received then the standing high bid is increased and a new provisional winner assigned (chosen at random in the case of a tie). It is not difficult to see that this allocation rule increases the risk of exposure for the bidders. In the CCA, the maximum revenue allocation is output. All bids, regardless of the time they were made, are eligible for this allocation, with the constraint that each bidder has at most one accepted bid.
Social Welfare
In practice these ascending auctions have performed extremely well. A major reason for this is that the associated dynamic processes encourage accurate price discovery [5, 16] . For the SMRA, there are theoretical results that explain this practical performance. These results are driven by the use of (aesthetically unappealing but important) standing high bids which ensure that every item with a positive price is sold, since each such item has a provisional winner. This concept of standing high bids was introduced by Crawford and Knoer [17] to study a simple market matching workers to firms. Their model encompasses an ascending auction with unit-demand bidders which converges, under truthful bidding, to a Walrasian equilibrium that maximizes social welfare. Moreover, Kelso and Crawford [29] showed that welfare-maximizing Walrasian equilibrium are also obtained, under truthful bidding, in auctions where the bidder valuations satisfy the gross substitutes property; see also [24] . The method to select items for price rises in the Kelso-Crawford mechanism differs from the more natural choice made by the SMRA, which increments the prices of all items under excess demand. Milgrom [33] , however, showed these results continue to hold for the SMRA. Walrasian equilibrium need not exist for more general valuations, but approximate welfare guarantees can still be obtained for submodular valuation functions [23] . No such theoretical results are know for the CCA and that is the motivation behind this work.
Bidding Activity Rules
It is important to note that, in practice, accompanying the ascending price mechanisms are a set of bidding activity rules. The activity rules are designed to induce truthful bidding in each round. This is extremely important -Cramton [16] states that the "truthful expression of preferences is what leads to excellent price discovery and ultimately an efficient auction outcome". For the SMRA, though, the activity rules are quite weak and strategic bidding is common and, often, profitable [16] . In contrast, the CCA incorporates a much stronger set of bidding activity rules for each round than the SMRA. In particular, the CCA applies a set of revealed preference (RP) constraints on feasible bids. Suppose at time s we bid for package S and at time t > s we bid for package T . In its weak form, see Ausubel et al. [5] , revealed preference produces a constraint
That is, such bidding behavior can only be rational if the price of package S has risen by at least the rise in the price of package T . If not the bid for package T is forbidden. Moreover, in its general form [26, 1] , the revealed preference rules ensure that the only bidding strategies that are admissible correspond to virtual valuation functions. Indeed, even relaxed implementations of the constraints allow only for approximate virtual valuation functions; see Boodaghians and Vetta [11] . If follows that strategic behavior must take a very restricted form in the CCA, essentially consisting of pre-commiting to a virtual valuation function. Given the lack of information and the dynamic nature of the CCA, such a pre-commitment is hard to compute and extremely risky. Consequently, the working assumption in this paper that bidders behave truthfully in a competitive CCA auction is reasonable.
Practical Implications
We show that modifying the price-increments can have fundamental impact on social welfare. This is quite remarkable because, in practice, the choice of price increments has been primarily considered as a matter of fine-tuning. Price increments are seen as a way to affect the length of the auction whilst having minimal effect on the final outcome. Indeed, Ausubel and Baranov [2] state that "Among all design decisions that need to be made prior to the auction, [the choice of price increments] is considered relatively unimportant and is often overlooked by the design team". Our results show that the choice of price increments is actually extremely important.
Our results also show that another apparently innocuous aspect of the CCA mechanism is vital in generating high welfare: the choice of stopping rule. Recall, the original CCA only terminates when there is no excess demand induced by the bids in the current round and the maximum revenue allocation over all rounds is not in conflict with the current round bids. Current implementations of the CCA are based upon the two-stage mechanism of Ausubel, Cramton and Milgrom [5] . There, the ascending price mechanism, as described, is used in the first-phase except that the stopping rule reverts to the simple rule used in the SMRA: the mechanism terminates if bids in the current round are disjoint. The use of this simple stopping rule is unfortunate: its use cannot guarantee high welfare. We present, in Section 6.2, a simple example with demand sets of cardinality two where, under this stopping rule, the CCA produces arbitrarily poor welfare, even when price-increments are a function of excess demand.
Finally, it remains to discuss computational aspects. The combinatorial allocation problem is notoriously hard to approximate (it contains maximum independent set as a special case). This appears to suggest that the CCA is not implementable in polynomial time. In spectrum auctions, however, bid patterns are highly structured. This has two major effects. First, given a set of prices, bidders do seem able to make bids in a timely manner. Second, the resultant combinatorial allocation problems can be solved almost instantaneously using standard branch and bound optimization techniques. As a consequence, it does not appear that computational constraints are currently a major concern in implementing ascending auctions in practice.
Related Work
An alternative approach for unit-demand auctions was examined by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [20] . Their ascending auction also outputs a Walrasian equilibrium that maximizes social welfare but without the need for standing high bidders. To achieve this, however, each bidder is now required to submit their entire demand set 3 in each round, rather than just a single bid as in the SMRA and CCA. Given prices, the mechanism tests whether a Walrasian equilibrium can be produced from the demand sets; if not, a set of items under excess demand is obtained based upon Hall's theorem. Gul and Stacchetti [25] showed this approach also generalizes to auctions where bidder valuations satisfy the gross substitutes property. Interestingly, these ascending auctions produce the minimum set of Walrasian prices, which in the case of unit-demands also correspond to VCG payments. However, Gul and Stacchetti [25] proved that it is not possible to implement the VCG mechanism via an ascending auction for general valuations, even those with the gross substitutes property. Thus, truthful bidding does not form an equilibrium in the corresponding direct mechanism. To go beyond the gross substitutes property, De Vries, Schummer and Vohra [38] dropped the requirement of anonymous prices. Instead, each bundle requires a separate price for each bidder.
From the theory of computation side, a relevant and fruitful direction is to approximate the welfare of a combinatorial auction with simple but not necessarily truthful auctions [13, 7, 27, 22, 37, 6] , for example, simultaneous single-item auctions, the ascending auction of Gul and Stacchetti, etc. The focus of this sequence of papers is to show the price of anarchy in these games is some small constant for a certain set of valuations. In particular, Babaioff et al. [6] showed that as long as the simple auction maximizes the welfare over the bidders' declared valuations, the price of anarchy is a small constant. Unfortunately, this result cannot be applied to the CCA, which is not a declared welfare maximizer. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, none the known results directly applies to the CCA. We suspect that the slow progress is largely due to the ignorance of the complicated dynamic behavior of the mechanism. We hope the results and techniques developed may help tackle other research questions related to the CCA, such as its price of anarchy.
The Combinatorial Clock Auction
We now give a detailed description of the CCA. To begin with, we present some notations and definitions. Let N be the set of the bidders and M be the set of items. Each bidder i has value v i (S) for any set of items S ⊆ M . The price p(S) for a set of item S is simply the sum of prices for each item in S. The utility of bidder i for set S is v i (S) − p(S), where p(S) is the price of S. The CCA outputs an allocation S = {S 1 , . . . , S n }, where the S i are pairwise-disjoint subsets of the items, and a collection of prices {p j } j∈ [m] . The social welfare of an allocation S is i v i (S i ) and the revenue is i p(S i ) = i j∈S i p j . Let OPT = max S i v i (S i ) be the optimal social welfare and R * be the corresponding allocation. The CCA is then formalized in Procedure 1.
Procedure 1 The Combinatorial Clock Auction
Let t = 0 and the initial price p 0 j be 0 for every item j. loop Each bidder i bids for the set of items S t i of largest positive utility (breaking ties arbitrarily). A bidder drops out if she has non-positive utility for every subset of M . Let P t i = j∈S t i p t j be the price for set S t i in round t. Note that the CCA does terminate. If not, prices will monotonically increase and eventually force every bidder to drop out, then the stopping condition is trivially satisfied. The length of the auction depends on ǫ. In most ascending auctions, the price increment ǫ is a small constant chosen by the auctioneer and the values of bidders are assumed to be integers. Since the CCA is scale invariant 4 , for notational simplicity, we set ǫ = 1 and assume every bidder i's value for any set of items S is a multiple of some integer W ≥ n 3 m 2 .
Before proceeding further, we present a few simple but useful facts about the CCA. The utility of bidder i in round t, denoted by u t i , is her utility for her favorite set of items, given the prices in round t. Formally,
Since S can be ∅, u t i is always non-negative. With this definition, we are ready to show some properties of the CCA. As Fact 2 is self-evident, we do not provide the proof here. Fact 1. For any bidder, u t i is monotonically non-increasing.
, contradicting the maximality of u t i .
Fact 2.
If bidder i bids on S in round t > 0, then v i (S)>u t i .
Fact 3.
If bidder i is still active when the stopping condition is met, then i is allocated a subset of items whose value is at least her utility in the final round.
Proof. Lett be the final round. Since no item in St i is allocated to any bidder j = i in the CCA (by definition of the stopping condition), the entire set St i may still be allocated by the mechanism to bidder i. Thus, i must win some items in the revenue-optimal allocation. Let us assume she wins S
i is clearly at least ut i .
Social Welfare Guarantees for the CCA
We are now ready to quantitatively analyse the CCA. We begin with the case of unit-demand bidders, and prove that the CCA achieves a polylogarithmic fraction of the optimal social welfare. Whilst the case of unit-demand bidders might seem limited, the techniques developed for this basic case will be important as we then use them to extend our results to general valuation functions.
The Welfare Ratio for Unit-demand Bidders
We say a bidder is unit-demand, if she demands one item at most. Formally, we define bidder i's valuation as v i (S) = max j∈S v ij where v ij is i's value for item j. For unit-demand bidders, a feasible allocation is simply a matching between the bidders and the items. In this section, we show the matching selected by the CCA achieves an Ω 1 log n log 2 m -fraction of the optimal social welfare. But we have already seen two mechanism that maximize social welfare in this special case. So before proving the logarithmic welfare ratio for the CCA, it is informative to understand why the CCA does not achieve optimality. First the Crawford-Knoer mechanism [17] achieves optimality via the use of standing high bids. But the motivation behind the CCA was to allow package bidding on multi-item auctions with complementarities and then standing high bids. The Demange et al. mechanism [20] achieves optimality by requiring that each bidder submits her entire demand set. From a theoretical viewpoint that is exactly the right thing to do, and the CCA losses out by requiring one bid per round only. In practice, however, the Gul and Stacchetti mechanism [25] (which generalizes the Demange et al. mechanism for general demand) would be extremely complicated for bidders to use. Moreover, it is not clear how one could use simple bidding activity rules to incentivize truthful bidding in such a complex auction. In contrast, the CCA is a very simple mechanism that is incentivizable using bidding activity rules. This is important as experiments [10] suggest that simplicity is key if we want to generate welfare and revenue. Now let's return to analysing the CCA. Whilst it is difficult to directly relate the welfare of the CCA with the optimal social welfare, we establish our result using a greedy allocation as a proxy of the CCA's outcome. We show that there are only two possibilities for the greedy allocation: (i) the revenue of this allocation is at least Ω OPT log n log 2 m
, and since the CCA selects the revenue optimal 7 allocation, its revenue can only be higher; or (ii) the greedy allocation has small revenue, but many bidders still have high utility when the ascending-price phase ends. Combining this property with Fact 3, we can immediately show that the welfare of the allocation selected by the CCA is at least Ω OPT log n . The greedy allocation method is shown in Procedure 2. Since bidders are unit-demand, we will use v ij to denote bidder i's value for item j, and s t i to denote the item bidder i bids on at round t. Our greedy algorithm simply allocates the item to the highest available bid, then removes all bids that conflict with it and repeats. We terminate this procedure when the highest bid is smaller than some predetermined threshold b only to make the analysis cleaner.
Procedure 2 Greedy Allocation Procedure for Unit-demand Bidders
)} i,t the collection of bids made in the CCA and b ≥ n 2 the threshold.
) be the bid with maximum price (break ties arbitrarily).
Allocate item s t i to bidder i with price p t
Remove every bid of bidder i and remove every bid (or any bidder) for item s t i in S. else return end if end while Theorem 4. Either the revenue of the CCA for unit-demand bidders is at least OPT 480 log n log 2 m or the social welfare is at least OP T 24 log n . 5 Thus, the welfare ratio is at most O(log n log 2 m).
We will use the following notation. Let X be the set of bidders that have been assigned items in the greedy algorithm andX be the set of items that are allocated to them. Let k ≥ |X| be some integer and c ∈ [3, n 2 − 1] be an integer that we will specify later. A key lemma is that if k is small then the utility of bidders that are not in X decreases in a slow rate. Specifically, Lemma 5 (Time Amplifying for Unit-demand Bidders). Let S be a set of at least c·k bidders disjoint from X (|X| ≤ k), such that every bidder i ∈ S has utility at least u ≥ 2b in round t ≥ b + c − 1. If the greedy algorithm has revenue less than k · b − mn, then in any round up to (c − 2)(t + 1) − 1 (the mechanism can terminate before that), there is a subset of at least |S| − c · k bidders of S such that each of them has utility at least u − 2b.
As Lemma 5 is mainly used when |S| >> c · k and u >> b, let us consider |S| and u being much larger than k and b. Intuitively, it states that if at round t there exists a large set S, in which all bidders have high utility, then throughout round c · t, most bidders in S (at least |S| − c · k bidders) still have high utility (u − 2b).
Before providing the formal proof of Lemma 5, let us first sketch the underlying idea. Notice that every bidder in S has utility at least u till round t. Thus, by Facts 1 and 2, every bidder i in S has value at least u for each item in Q i , where Q i is the collection of every item that i ever bid on in the first t rounds. For any set S ′ ⊆ S, if all bidders in S ′ have utility no more than u − 2b at a certain round, then every item in ∪ i∈S ′ Q i must have price at least 2b. However, for any item in ∪ i∈S ′ Q i −X, only bidders selected by the greedy algorithm (the ones in X) can bid on it after the price has reached b. If not, then there exists a bidder outside X that should have been chosen by the greedy algorithm because she made a bid on some item not inX at price higher than b. If |S ′ | ≥ c · k, then it is easy to argue that | ∪ i∈S ′ Q i −X| ≈ c·t·k b . As each item in ∪ i∈S ′ Q i −X requires about b bids from bidders in X, these bidders need to make roughly c · t · k many bids. There are at most k bidders in X so, in total, this will take at least c · t rounds. We are now ready to present the formal argument.
Proof of Lemma 5: Let t ′ be the first round where at least c · k bidders from S have utility at most u − 2b, and let S ′ be the set of these bidders. If t ′ does not exist, then at least |S| − c · k bidders from S have utility at least u − 2b when the mechanism terminates. Lemma 5 holds.
Because every bidder i ∈ S has utility u at round t, Facts 1 and 2 ensure that v ij ≥ u for any item j that i bids on in the first t rounds. Let M ′ be the items in M −X that are bid on by some bidder in S ′ during the first t rounds. Bidders in S ′ make |S ′ | · t bids in total. How many bids can they make onX? No bidder from S ′ is allocated an item by the greedy algorithm. Therefore, for any item j inX, none of the bids made by bidders in S ′ can exceed the price p j that the greedy algorithm sells the item for. So, before the final round, the total number of bids from S ′ on item j is less than p j . In the last round, they make at most |S ′ | ≤ n bids. Therefore, the total number of bids made onX is at most the revenue of the greedy allocation plus n · m, which is at most k · b by assumption.
As none of the bidders from S ′ is selected by the greedy algorithm, bidders from S ′ must stop bidding on any item in M −X after its price reach b. Thus, the total number of bids made by bidders from S ′ on any item in M −X is at most b + n, implying |M ′ | ≥ |S ′ |·t−k·b b+n . Note that for each item in M ′ , at least one bidder in S ′ has value at least u for it. Thus, at round t ′ , the price for each of these items must be at least 2b, otherwise that bidder will have utility greater than u − 2b.
In the round when the price of j passes b, its price is at most b + n. Bidders from X need to make at least another b − n bids to drive the price up to 2b. Because |M ′ | ≥ |S ′ |·t−k·b b+n , they must make at least (b − n) · (|S ′ |·t−k·b) b+n bids. As there are at most k bidders in X, we have
By definition of t ′ , it is then straightforward to see that at round t ′ − 1 ≥ (c − 2)(t + 1) − 1 there are at least |S| − c · k bidders from S such that each of them has utility at least u − 2b.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we need one more Lemma. The proof of this Lemma is fairly standard. However we prove it for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 6. Let R * = (R 1 , . . . , R n ) be the allocation that maximizes the social welfare. Then there exists a set B and a real number v * such that every bidder i ∈ B has value between [v * , 2v * ] for the set R i and the total value for bidders in B is at least OPT 3 log n . 9
Proof. Let there be ℓ non-empty sets in R * , and we define the value for a set R i to be
OPT. Now we construct 2⌈log n⌉ + 1 bins, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2⌈log n⌉ the i-th bin B i contains all sets with values in (
The last bin contains all the other sets. Since every set in the last bin has value at most OPT n 2 and contains at most n sets, the total value of the last bin is at most OPT n . Therefore,
) is the sum of the values from sets in B i . That means there exists a bin B i * such that
We simply let B = B i * .
With Lemma 5 and 6, we are ready to prove Theorem 4. Again, we first sketch the proof idea. Let B and v * be the same as in Lemma 6. We set the threshold b to be Θ( v * log m ). The goal is to argue that if the revenue of the greedy allocation is less than Θ(
), then most bidders from B still have utility as high as Θ(v * ) when the CCA terminates. This implies the social welfare is at least Θ( OPT log n ) by Fact 3. First note that if more than B log m bidders are selected by the greedy algorithm (i.e. bidders in X) then the revenue already meets our target. So we assume this is not the case. This means the number of bidders in B − X is at least log m times more than the number of bidders in X. Since all these bidders have utility at least v * ≈ log m · b in the beginning, we can apply Lemma 5 to this set of bidders. The key insight in this proof is that we can repetitively apply Lemma 5 on the set of bidders that still have high utility. Because each application of Lemma 5 decreases the size of the set of bidders and their utilities linearly in |X| and b, we can apply it Θ(log m) times provided the CCA has not yet terminated. If this is the case, the CCA runs for at least Θ(m · b) rounds. Since any active bidder makes a bid each round, it is easy to show that throughout Θ(m · b) many rounds this bidder has to make a bid on some item outsideX (the set of items allocated in the greedy algorithm) at a price larger than b. This gives a contradiction. Hence, the CCA must terminate before that amount of rounds. In this case, we can argue that at least a constant fraction of bidders in B − X still have utility Θ(v * ) when the CCA terminates, implying high social welfare. We now formalise this argument.
Proof of Theorem 4: Let B and v * be as in Lemma 6. We use K to denote the size of B. Let the threshold b = v * c 1 log m and k = K c 2 log m for some constants c 1 and c 2 that will be specified later. We will prove that either the revenue of the greedy algorithm, with our choice of b, is at least g = OPT 6c 1 c 2 log n log 2 m or the social welfare of the CCA is at least OPT 24 log n . First, by Lemma 6 and our choice of the parameters, it is easy to verify that k · b ≥ g. So we can assume |X| ≤ k from now on. Otherwise the revenue is already at least |X| · b > g. Let X ′ be the set of bidders that items inX are allocated to under R * and let Y = B − X − X ′ . Because |X ′ | ≤ |X| = |X| ≤ k, we have |Y | ≥ (c 2 log m − 2)k. Let Z be the set of items that are allocated to bidders in Y in the allocation R * , and let t 1 be the first round (if it exists) where at least c · k items in Z have prices at least 2b. We proceed by case analysis.
Case (1): t 1 does not exist. By the definition of t 1 , this means that when the CCA terminates at round t, there exists a set Y ′ ⊆ Y of bidders whose allocated items in R * have prices no more than 2b at round t and |Y ′ | ≥ |Y | − ck ≥ |Y |/2. Therefore, u t i ≥ v * − 2b ≥ v * /2 for any bidder i ∈ Y ′ . By Fact 3, the social welfare of the greedy allocation is then at least
Case (2): t 1 exists. Since Z is disjoint fromX, only bidders from X can bid on items in Z after their prices reach b. Thus,
, because k ≥ |X| and b ≥ n 2 and c ≥ 3,
By the definition of t 1 , we know at round t 1 − 1 there are at least |Y | − c · k bidders whose allocated items in R * have prices less than 2b. Let us call this set of bidders Y 1 , and clearly they all have utility at least u 1 = v * − 2b at round t 1 − 1. Let t 2 be the first round (if it exists) that at least c
Remember that we might not be able to run the recursion till the conditions are violated, because the CCA might terminate before that. We now use case analysis to show that if we take ℓ = log m + 2, then our claim holds no matter whether t ℓ exists or not. Case (i): The CCA terminates between t j and t j+1 for some j < ℓ. In this case, there are at least |Y j | − c · k bidders each of whom has utility at least u j − 2b.
Thus, as in Case (1), the social welfare of the greedy allocation is at least OP T 24 log n . Case (ii): t ℓ exists. In this case, we argue that there is a bidder who has made a bid larger than b on M \ X ′ that has not been selected by the greedy algorithm. This results in a contradiction.
The last inequality holds because every bidder in B receives an item, so k ≤ K ≤ m. Hence, there is a bidder i in Y ℓ that has made (k + m) · b bids in the ascending-price phase. The revenue of the greedy allocation is less than k · b, so i can make at most k · b bids on items inX. Therefore, i makes at least m · b bids on M −X, which means there must be one item j in M −X that i has bid on with price larger than b. This cannot happen, otherwise i would have been selected by the greedy algorithm.
An Upper Bound on the Welfare Ratio for General Bidders
In this section, we generalize Theorem 4 to accommodate general valuation functions. The idea is similar. Using a greedy algorithm as a proxy for the CCA, we argue that there are only two possibilities: (i) the revenue of the greedy allocation is at least Ω OPT C 2 log n log 2 m
, and since the CCA selects the revenue optimal allocation, it must achieve no less revenue than the greedy allocation; or (ii) the greedy allocation has small revenue, but many bidders still have high utility at the final round. Using Fact 3, we can immediately show that the welfare of the allocation selected by the CCA is at least Ω( OPT log n ). Let us first specify the greedy algorithm.
Theorem 7.
If bidders only bid on sets with cardinality at most C, then the either the revenue of the CCA is at least OPT 480C 2 log n log 2 m or the social welfare of the CCA is at least OP T 24 log n . Thus, the welfare ratio is at most O(C 2 · log n log 2 m).
Procedure 3 Greedy Allocation Procedure for General Bidders
Input: M is the set of items. N is the set of bidders. S = {(S t i , P t i )} i,t is the collection of bids made in the CCA. b ≥ n 2 is a threshold on the bid price. while S = ∅ do Let (S t i , P t i ) be a bid of maximum price (break ties arbitrarily). if P t i ≥ b then Allocate the set of items S t i to bidder i with price P t i . else return end if Remove from S every bid made by bidder i and every bid for a set of items that are not disjoint from S t i . end while Before proving Theorem 7, let us generalize the time amplifying lemma for general bidders. Let X be the set of bidders that have been assigned items in the greedy algorithm andX be the set of items that are allocated. Let k ≥ |X| be some integer. As in the unit-demand case, we will argue a generalization of Lemma 5 for general bidders. With this Lemma, it is straightforward to argue that either at least one bidder not in X must make b · m bids on bundles of items which do not intersect withX, or many bidders still have high utility when the price ascending phase ends.
Lemma 8 (Time Amplifying for General Bidders)
. Let S be a set of at least 4C · k bidders disjoint from X (|X| ≤ k), such that every bidder i ∈ S has utility at least u ≥ 2C · b in round t ≥ 5/2 · b · C. If the greedy algorithm has revenue g less than kb − mn, then in any round up to 2(t + 1) − 1 (the mechanism can terminate before this), there is a subset of S with at least |S| − 4C · k bidders such that each of them has utility at least u − 2C · b.
Proof. Let t ′ be the first round that at least 4C · k bidders from S have utility at most u − 2C · b, and S ′ be the set of these bidders. It is not difficult to argue that if t ′ does not exist, the conclusion holds.
Since every bidder i ∈ S has utility u in round t, by Fact 1 and 2, we know that for any set S that i bids on in the first t rounds, v i (S) ≥ u. Let M ′ be the subsets of items in M −X that has ever been bid on by some bidder from S ′ in the first t rounds. The bidders of S ′ totally make |S ′ | · t bids. How many of their bids can intersect withX? Let us assume the greedy algorithm allocates set S r i i to bidder i. Since bidders in S are not selected by the greedy algorithm, they cannot bid on any item j ∈ S r i i after its price has reached P r i i , so they can make at most P r i i + n bids containing j. As the size of S r i i is at most C, bidders from S can make at most CP r i i + Cn bids that intersect with S r i i . Totally, bidders can make at most Cg + Cnm ≤ Ckb bids that intersect with X, as i∈X P r i i = g ≤ kb − nm. Therefore, bidders from S ′ make at least |S ′ | · t − Ckb bids only on subsets of M ′ .
For any item j ∈ M ′ , there could be at most b + n bids from bidders in S containing j. As every bid is on a set with size at most C, for any set that has ever been bid on, there can be at most Cb + Cn other bids that intersect with it. Therefore, we can find at least
Cb+Cn disjoint bids on M ′ that are made in the first t rounds by bidders of S ′ . Let T be the set of items bid by one of these disjoint bids. The total price for T at round t ′ should be at least 2Cb, otherwise at least one of the bidders in S ′ will have utility greater than u − 2Cb. On the other hand, for any item j ∈ T , bidders in S ′ can bid on sets containing it only when its price is less than b or when the set intersectsX, since otherwise the bid would have been selected by the greedy algorithm. As |T | ≤ C, bids from X and bids intersectingX must push up the price for T by at least C · (b − n). Since there are at least
Cb+Cn such disjoint sets and at most Ckb bids can intersect withX, the bids from X on M ′ must increase the total price of items in M ′ by at least
By the definition of t ′ , it is straightforward to see in round t ′ − 1 ≥ 2(t + 1) − 1 there are at least |S| − 4C · k bidders from S such that each of them has utility at least u − 2C · b.
We now have all the tools we need to prove Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7: First let us fix the notations. In Lemma 6, we make no assumption on the sets {R i } i∈ [n] . In particular, we do not assume it is a singleton. Therefore, Lemma 6 also holds in the general case. Let B and v * be the same as in Lemma 6, and use K to denote the size of B. Let the threshold b = v * c 1 ·C·log m and k = K c 2 ·C·log m for some constants c 1 and c 2 that we will specify later. We prove by contradiction that the revenue of the greedy algorithm with our choice of b is at least
or the social welfare of the CCA is at least OP T 24 log n . As in Theorem 4, we can immediately show that k·b ≥ g. Thus, if the number of bidders selected by the greedy algorithm |X| exceeds k, the revenue is clearly greater than g. So we can assume |X| ≤ k. Let X ′ be the set of bidders that are allocated a subset of items that intersect withX in R * , and Y = B −X −X ′ . Since |X ′ | ≤ |X| ≤ C|X| ≤ Ck, we have |Y | ≥ (c 2 ·C ·log m−C −1)k. Take t 1 (if it exists) to be the first round that at least 4C · k bidders from Y , such that their allocated sets of items in R * all have prices at least 2C · b. We continue our proof with the following case analysis.
• Case (1): t 1 does not exist. Then when the algorithm stops at round t, less than 4C ·k subsets of items allocated to bidders from Y in R * have prices at least 2Cb. Let Y ′ be the bidders of Y such that the total price of the set of items R i allocated to i is at most 2Cb at round t (remind that R i refers to the set of items allocated to i in R * ). Notice that |Y ′ | ≥ |Y | − 4Ck ≥ |Y |/2 and u t i ≥ v * − 2Cb ≥ v * /2 for any i ∈ Y ′ . Fact 3 implies that the social welfare of the CCA is at least
• Case (2): t 1 exists. Let T be the allocated set of items of one of the 4C · k bidder. As we have argued in Lemma 8, for any item j in T , only bidders from X or bids intersect withX can bid on any set containing j after its price reaches b. A simple calculation shows that bidders from X must make at least 4Ck · (b − n) · C − C 2 kb bids (as we notice in the proof of Lemma 8 that at most C 2 kb of total price increment is due to bids that intersect withX) in the first t 1 rounds. Hence, bidders from X must make at least 3(b − n)C · k − n bids, which means t 1 is at least
. Since k ≥ |X| and b ≥ n 2 , we have t 1 ≥ 
If we let c 1 = 8 and c 2 = 10, we have ℓ ′ ≥ 2[log m] + 8. Let ℓ = log m + 2. Remember that we might not be able to run the recursion till the conditions are violated, because the CCA might terminate before that. We now use case analysis to show that if we take ℓ = log m + 2, then our claim holds no matter the CCA terminates before t ℓ or not.
-Case (i): The CCA terminates between t j and t j+1 where j < ℓ. By our choice of the parameters, we have |Y i | − 4Ck ≥ |Y |/2 and u i − 2Cb ≥ v * /2. Thus if t j+1 does not exist, Fact 3 implies that the welfare of the CCA is at least (
which means there is a bidder i in Y ℓ that has made at least (Ck + m) · C · b bids in the price ascending phase. Since the revenue of the greedy allocation is less than k · b − nm, so as we have argued in Lemma 8, i can make at most C 2 · k · b bids on sets of items intersectingX. Therefore, i makes at least C · m · b bids contained in M −X, then there must be a set S ⊆ M −X that i has bid on with price at least b. This is a contradiction, because i would have been selected by the greedy algorithm.
Lower Bounds on the Welfare Ratio

Lower bounds for Unit-demand bidders
In this section, we present lower bounds on the welfare ratio of the CCA. To begin, we show give a polylogarithmic lower bound for unit-demand bidders. In particular, this implies that the welfare ratio of the CCA is at least Ω log m log log m . This implies that for any non-negative real numbers a and b such that a + b < 1, the welfare ratio is at least Ω(n a · log b m).
Notice that Theorem 9 does not contradict with the polylogarithmic upper bound obtained in Theorem 4. The number of items m of our construction in Theorem 9 is exponential in the number of bidders n, therefore (log n · log 2 m) is larger than n log n . Theorem 9 states that the welfare ratio is at least Ω( n log n ) if it only depends on n, and is at least Ω( log m log log m ) if it only depends on m. More generally, Theorem 9 implies that there is no welfare ratio dominating 6 any weighted geometric mean of the above two ratios, even if we allow dependency on both n and m. On the one hand, this shows that if any approximation ratio has only sub-logarithmic dependence on m, it must have polynomial dependence on n. On the other hand, although Theorem 4 has come quite close to the lower bound above, it has quadratic dependence on log m, thus not contradicting with Theorem 9.
The idea behind the lower bound consists in constructing an instance that is essentially tight with respect to the proof of Theorem 4. In particular, in the lower bound instance, we ensure that there are only two bidders who ever make large bids. All the other bidders only make small bids and their largest bids are on items they value the least! Thus, the revenue maximizing allocation selected by the CCA has very poor social welfare. Moreover, we have a similar hardness result for the general case.
Proof. Let k, ℓ be two integers. We will show that for sufficiently large k and ℓ we can construct an instance that has low social welfare as promised. To avoid cumbersome notations, we assume that the price increment of the CCA is 1 when two bidders bid on it. Let us denote by (u n ) n the sequence such that u 0 = 1,
Let us consider the following instance of the CCA. There are 2k+2 bidders s 0 , s ′ 0 , s 1 , s ′ 1 . . . , s k , s ′ k . For each bidder s i with i ≥ 1 and for every v ∈ [ℓ], create a set of items X i v such that there are u ℓ−v items in X i v . In other words, bidder s i has one item of value ℓ, k + 1 items of value ℓ − 1, u 2 items of value ℓ − 2, etc.. Let X v = ∪ k i=1 X i v and we will refer to it as the set of items of value v 7 . Moreover, we assume that bidder s i has the following preference rule over the items: if there are a few items with the same utility, the one with the lowest value is preferred. This preference rule can also be simulated by making a small modification to the valuation function of s i . We will stick with the preferences rule, as we believe it makes the proof cleaner. The bidders s ′ 1 , . . . , s ′ k are respectively copies of bidders s 1 , . . . , s k . Since they have the same valuation functions and the same preference rules, we can assume that at any round they will bid on the same item.
Let us now describe the valuation function of s 0 . For every v ≤ ℓ, the value of s 0 for any item in X v is v. Finally, we create a new item which is added in X ℓ and we assume that s 0 has value ℓ for this item. We further assume that, this new item is the one preferred by s 0 among all items of value ℓ. We also assume that s 0 has the following preference rule: if there are a few items with the same utility, the one with the highest value is preferred. Note that the preference rule ensures that if an item of X i v has price p and an item of X i v−1 has price (p − 1), bidder s i bids on the item in X i v−1 while s 0 bids on the item in X i v . Again we create a bidder s ′ 0 as a copy of s 0 . The fact that bidder s i prefers the item with the lowest value (and the fact that X i v−1 is large compared to X i v ) will ensure that the welfare of the allocation of the CCA is small compared to the optimal one. The key step is to prove the following statement: Claim 1. None of the bidders s 1 , s ′ 1 , . . . , s k , s ′ k makes a bid of price at least 2. Moreover, all their bids of price 1 are performed on items of X 1 .
Proof. At round t = 0, all the bidders s 1 , s ′ 1 . . . , s k , s ′ k bid on their favorite items (the items of value ℓ for their own valuation functions). Both bidders s 0 and s ′ 0 bid on their favorite item, which is the special item in X ℓ . So the prices of all these items increase by one (by definition of the price increment). Now, all items of X ℓ have price 1 and all the other items have price 0.
By construction of our preference rules, bidders s 1 , s ′ 1 . . . , s k , s ′ k start bidding on items of value ℓ − 1 and s 0 , s ′ 0 bid on items of value ℓ. Recall that since s i , s ′ i are copies of the same bidder, they bid on the same item at any round. Since, for every i ≤ k, X i ℓ−1 contains k + 1 items, bidder s i and s ′ i need to spend k + 1 rounds to increase the prices of all the items in X i ℓ−1 from 0 to 1. Since there are k + 1 items in X ℓ , bidders s 0 , s ′ 0 also need k + 1 rounds to increase the prices of all the items of value ℓ from 1 to 2. So by the end of round t = k + 2, all items in X ℓ have price 2 and all items in X ℓ−1 have price 1. All the other items have price 0.
We now repeat this argument by induction. More precisely, we will show that for every v, there exists a round t v such that:
• All items in X v−p have price 0 by the end of round t v for any p > 0.
• All items in X v+p by the end of round t v have price p + 1 for any p ≥ 0.
We have already showed that t ℓ = 1 and t ℓ−1 = k + 2. Let us prove that the existence of t v implies the existence of t v−1 . Let us study the structure of the bids at round t v . By construction of the preference rule, bidders s 1 , s ′ 1 , . . . , s k , s ′ k prefer bidding on items of value (v − 1) at price 0. On the other hand, the bidders s 0 , s ′ 0 prefer bidding on items of value between v and ℓ (more precisely they prefer items in X ℓ , then X ℓ−1 and so on). Since by definition of the sequence (u n ) n , the number of items in X i v−1 is is equal to the number of items in ∪ ℓ v ′ =v X v ′ . So, for every i, the number of rounds needed by the bidders s i and s ′ i to increase the prices of all the items of X i v−1 from 0 to 1 is exactly the number of rounds needed by s 0 and s ′ 0 to increase all the prices of all the items in X v ′ for any v ≤ v ′ ≤ ℓ by one.
Consider finally by the end of round t 1 . All items in X v have price v for any v ≤ ℓ. The preference rule ensures that, bidders s 1 , s ′ 1 . . . , s k , s ′ k will increase the prices of items of X 1 8 . On the other hand, bidders s 0 and s ′ 0 increase the prices of all the items in X v for v ≥ 2 before increasing the prices of items in X 1 . Since the size of X i 1 is precisely the size of ∪ ℓ v=2 X v for every i, after |X i 1 | rounds the price for each item has increased by one. Now, all items in X v have price v + 1 for every v ≤ ℓ. As a result, all bidders have negative utility and they drop out.
Finally, we compare the optimal welfare with the welfare of the allocation of the CCA. The optimal solution allocates to each of s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s k her favorite item of value ℓ. Then we can allocate to s ′ 0 , s ′ 1 , . . . , s ′ k an item in X i ℓ−1 for every i. The welfare of the optimal allocation is Θ(kℓ). The allocation of the CCA allocates an item of X ℓ at price ℓ to both s 0 and s ′ 0 . All the other bidders only bid on items at price 0 except for items in X 1 , on which they make bids at price 1, so the CCA allocates an item of value 1 to each of s 1 , s ′ 1 , . . . , s k , s ′ k . Therefore, the welfare of the CCA is 2ℓ + 2k. Note that the number of items in this construction is m = Θ(k ℓ ) (the number of items of value v − 1 is essentially k times the number of items of value v). Now if we choose k = Θ(log m), and the number of bidders is n = Θ(k). for some a and b such
. Since a + b < 1, this guarantee contradicts with our instance above.
Lower bounds for General Bidders
Let us now prove that a similar lower bound can be obtained for general bidders. . In particular, this implies that the welfare ratio of the CCA is at least Ω C · log m log log m . This implies that for any non-negative real numbers a and b such that a + b < 1, the welfare ratio is at least O(n a · (C · log m) b ).
Proof. Let k, ℓ, C be three integers. We fix C to be an odd constant, and we will show that for sufficiently large k and ℓ we can construct an instance that has low social welfare as promised. The proof uses the same ingredient as the proof of Theorem 9 but is slightly more involved. We assume that the price increment for any item is 1/2 times the number of bidders bidding on it. Let u n be the following sequence:
Note that since C is odd, u n is a sequence of integers.
The instance of the CCA has k · C + 2 bidders. They are denoted by :s i 1 , . . . , s i C for every i ≤ k and two special bidders denoted by s 0 and s ′ 0 . Let B i be the set of bidders s i 1 , . . . , s i C . Before describing the construction, we first introduce the v-gadgets.
v-gadgets. We say a set K of C 2 items form a v-gadget for a set of bidders {s 1 , . . . , s C }, if we can use edges of a clique on C vertices to encode K, such that for any bidder s i only the subset of items corresponding to all edges incident to the vertex i has value C · v to her, while all the other subsets have value 0. Note that, for any item of the v-gadget, there are exactly two bidders containing it in their interested bundles (since each edge has two endpoints).
Instance. Before introducing formally the instance, let us briefly describe it. As in the matching case, all the bidders only bid on items with price 0 till the last round except bidders s 0 and s ′ 0 . At any round, bidders in B i for every i bid on a disjoint v-gadget. We will create the appropriate number of v-gadgets (and an appropriate preference rule) to ensure that none of the bids is positive except on items with low value. Therefore, we can argue the revenue optimal allocation selected by the CCA has low social welfare.
For every v ∈ [ℓ] and every i ∈ [k], we create a set X i v of u ℓ−v copies of the v-gadgets for bidders in B i . Additionally, for every bidder s i j , we create a special item r i j . Each bidder s j i has value 1/2 for her special item and C · v for any bundle of items corresponding to the set of all edges of the i-th vertex in some v-gadget of X i v for all v ∈ [ℓ], but has value 0 for any other bundle. We use X v to denote the union of all X i v and refer to it as the set of items with value v. To simplify the proof, we assume that all bidders in B i obey the following preference rule: (i) all bidders have the same preference order over the v-gadgets of the same utility, i.e. if two v-gadgets have exactly the same prices 9 , then all bidders prefer the same v-gadget; (ii) each bidder s i j prefers 9 Each item and its counterpart in the other v-gadget shares the same price.
to bid on the set of items with lower value when there is a tie; (iii) a bidder will not bid on any v-gadget with utility 0, but will still bid on her special item at price 1 2 . As we mentioned in the proof of Theorem 9, the preference rule above can be easily simulated with slight perturbations on the valuation functions. Now we describe the valuation function of s 0 . We first create a special item r 0 with value 1/2, and add a set of C new items to X ℓ such that the whole set has value C · v. For any v-gadget, we partition it into C−1 2 disjoint subsets of size C, such that v 0 's value for each of these subsets is C · v. Except the bundles mentioned above, all other bundles have value 0. We also assume that s 0 obeys a preference rule: (i) among all bundles of value C · ℓ, the bundle of C new items is preferred; (ii) s 0 prefers the set of items with higher value when there is a tie. Finally, we create s ′ 0 as a copy of bidder s 0 , such that she has the same valuation function and same preference over bundles.
Our preference rule ensures that the CCA's welfare is small. The key step of our proof is to show the following statement: Proof. The proof is similar to Claim 1.
At round t = 0, all bidders s j 1 , . . . , s j C bid on their favorite bundles (the unique bundle of value C · ℓ in the ℓ-gadget). Moreover s 0 and s ′ 0 bid on the bundle of new items in X ℓ (the set of C items we create when we define the valuation function of s 0 ). So by the end of the first round, the prices of all items of X ℓ are increased to 1, while the prices for all the other items remain at 0.
By definition of our preference rules, bidders s i 1 , . . . , s i C start bidding on (ℓ − 1)-gadgets and s 0 , s ′ 0 continue to bid on the ℓ-gadgets. Since there are k ·
2 + 1 rounds to increase the prices of all the items in X ℓ−1 from 0 to 1. Since there are k · C 2 + C items in X ℓ and these items are partitioned into subsets of size C, bidders s 0 , s ′ 0 also need k · C−1 2 + 1 rounds to increase the prices of all these items of value ℓ from 1 to 2. So by the end of round t = k · C−1 2 + 2, all the items in X ℓ have price 2 and all the items in X ℓ−1 have price 1. All the other items still have price 0.
We now repeat this argument by induction. More precisely, let us prove that, for every v, there exists a round t v such that:
We have already showed that t ℓ = 1 and t ℓ−1 = k · C−1 2 + 2. Now we will prove that the existence of t v implies the existence of t v−1 . Let us first understand the structure of the bids at round t v . By construction of the preference rule, s i 1 , . . . , s i C prefer bidding on bundles of the (v − 1)-gadgets in X i v−1 which have price 0 for every i ∈ [k]. Since they have the same preference over the gadgets, they bid on the same (v − 1)-gadget. In the meantime, the bidders s 0 , s ′ 0 are bidding on v ′ -gadgets with v ≤ v ′ ≤ ℓ (more precisely, they first bid on ℓ-gadgets, then on (ℓ − 1)-gadgets, etc.). By the definition of the sequence (u n ) n , the number of (v − 1)-gadgets in X i v−1 equals to
. Thus, the number of rounds needed by the bidders s i 1 , . . . , s i C to increase the prices of all the items in X i v−1 from 0 to 1 is exactly the number of rounds needed by s 0 and s ′ 0 to increase the prices of all the items in X v ′ for any v ≤ v ′ ≤ ℓ by 1. As a result, t v−1 exists and equals to t v + |X i v−1 |. By the end of round t 1 , every bidder has utility 0 on any item in X v for any v ∈ [ℓ]. In the next round, all bidders bid on their special items. By the end of round t 1 + 1, each items r i j has price 1 2 and r 0 has price 1. Thus, bidders s 0 and s ′ 0 drop out (since the last item reach price 1) and the 18 other bidders will bid on their special items for another round at price 1/2. By the end of round t 1 + 2, the mechanism terminates as the stopping condition is met. Namely, all bids are disjoint and the revenue optimal allocation does not conflict with the final allocation.
Now we are ready to compare the welfare of the CCA to the optimal social welfare. Consider the following allocation (which is not optimal but sufficient to show our result): for every i, assign s i 1 its bundle in the ℓ-gadget, each of the other bidders her bundle in a distinct (ℓ − 1)-gadget (assuming k ≥ 2). The welfare of this allocation is larger than Θ(k · C 2 · ℓ). In the revenue optimal allocation selected by the CCA, two disjoints sets of value C · ℓ are allocated to s 0 and s ′ 0 , and all the other bidders only receive their special items of value 1 2 . The welfare of the CCA is only 2C · ℓ + k · C/2. Note that the number of items in this construction is Θ((k · C) ℓ ) (the number of items of value v − 1 is essentially k · C times the number of items of value v) and the number of bidders is Θ(C · k). Since log C ≤ c·log m for some absolute constant c, we choose k to be Θ(log m), then ℓ = Θ 
The Importance of the Price Increment and the Stopping Rule
In this section, we show that if price increments do not depend of the demand or if the stopping condition is replaced by the one of the SMRA (the auction stops when the bids are disjoint), then we can obtain lower bounds on the welfare ratio.
Welfare Under the Original CCA
In the original CCA model designed by Porter et al. [36] , the price increment is always 1 when there is an excess demand. In this section, we show that the welfare under this model could be as low as O( OPT poly(n) ) even for simple valuations such as additive and unit-demand valuations. The valuation function of bidder i is additive if a bidder's value for set S is the sum of the values of the items in S.
Lemma 11. Assume that the price increment does not depend on the demand. For any constants N and M, there exists an instance with n ≥ N unit-demand bidders and m ≥ M items such that the social welfare of the CCA is only O(
). This implies that for any non-negative real numbers a and b such that a + b ≤ 1, the welfare ratio is at least Ω(n a/2 · m b/2 ).
Proof. Let n ≥ max(N , M). Consider a unit-demand auction with items {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}. Let t be a real defined below. We have two classes of bidders. In the first class we have n bidders and for any package S, bidder i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) has a value v i (S) = max Let us examine what happens in this auction. Each pair of bidders in the second class will bid on the cheapest item in the set H ℓ of cardinality √ n. In the case of a tie, we may assume they both bid on the smallest index item. 10 It follows that after V · √ n rounds the price of every item in H ℓ will reach V and then the pair of bidders ℓ will drop out of the auction. Meanwhile, bidder i in the first class will continually bid on item 0, at least until its price is t · V − V . This will take (t − 1) · V rounds. But at this time, provided we set t ≥ √ n + 1, the price of item i will be above V . So bidder i will continue to bid on item 0 until its price reaches t · V when it will drop out of the auction.
Given this set of bids what is the optimal allocation? For 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ √ n − 1, both bidders of type ℓ in the second class will be allocated one item from the set H ℓ . Furthermore, exactly one bidder i of the first class, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, will be allocated the item 0. The other bidders of the first class do not make any bid on any other items and thus are not allocated anything. Thus the total welfare of this allocation is 2 √ n · V + t · V = (3 √ n + 1) · V On the other hand the optimal allocation has value n · V + t · V = (n + √ n + 1) · V Hence the welfare ratio is at least 1 3 √ n.
Lemma 12. Assume that the price increment does not depend on the demand. For any constants N and M, there exists an instance with n ≥ N bidders that bid on sets of size at most 2 and m ≥ M items such that the social welfare of the CCA is only O(
. This implies that for any non-negative real numbers a and b such that a + b ≤ 1, the welfare ratio is at least Ω(n a · m b ).
Proof. Let n ≥ max(N , M). Consider an auction with items {0, 1, . . . , n}. Let there be 2n bidders. In particular, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n there are two identical bidders of Type i. Each Type i bidders has a 2-demand function v i , that is, additive up to 2 items. Each individual item is valued as:
Here V is a large integer. Now let's run the CCA with a price increment of ǫ = 1 for excess demand items. We begin with all price equal to zero. Then each Type i bidder bids for the pair {0, i} as it provides a utility of 2V . Not that since there are two bidders for each type the every item is in excess demand, so all prices rise to 1. Each Type i bidder then still bids for the pair {0, i}, and continues to do so until every item has a price of V . The auction then terminates with all prices equal to V + 1. But now, given these bids, when we find a maximum revenue allocation we may only accept one bid since every submitted bid contained the item 0. Thus we obtain a welfare of 2V . In contrast, it is easy to see that the optimal welfare is (n + 1) · V . Hence the welfare ratio is 1 2 (n + 1).
Finally note that in [9] , a similar example shows the poor performance of the Porter et al. mechanism.
Bad Examples using the SMRA Stopping Condition
In our CCA and as well as the original model of Porter et.al [36] , the CCA terminates when there is no excess demand induced by the bids in the current round and the maximum revenue allocation over all rounds is not in conflict with the current round bids. A simpler condition is to stop immediately once the bids become disjoint as in the SMRA. This simpler rule is now used in recent real-world CCA auctions. In the following example, we show that the SMRA stopping condition has arbitrarily bad performance when used in the CCA. At round 0, every bidder bids on their favorite set. Bidder 1 bids on set {1, 2}, bidder 2 bids on set {3, 4} and bidder 3 bids on set {2, 3}. It is easy to verify that at round t ≤ V , these are still the sets bidders bid on. Both item 1 and 4 have price t, and both item 2 and 3 have price 2t. At round V + 1, bidder 1 and 2 drop out as they have utility 0, while bidder 3 still bids on set {2, 3} with total price 4V + 4. If we stop at this round, the revenue optimal allocation gives item 1 and 2 to bidder 1 with price 3V and item 3 and 4 to bidder 2 with price 3V . The welfare for this allocation is 6V . Since c > 2, the welfare maximizing allocation should give bidder 3 both items 2 and 3, give bidder 1 item 1 and give bidder 2 item 4. The welfare of this allocation is 2(c + 1) · V . So the welfare ratio of the CCA with this stopping rule is at least c+1 6 = Θ(c). Since c can be arbitrarily large and does not depend on n and m, the welfare ratio can be arbitrarily bad which achieves the proof.
